Some issues raised by J. K. Arrow in "Higher Education as a Filter" are discussed and clarified. The central question is Does higher education, to the extent that it acts as a filter, create new information about the abilities of students, or does it utilize known information to sort students according to their abilities? The creation of new information is termed the testing function of higher education and the sorting of students, the sorting function. The higher education system described by Arrow, in explaining the filter concept, does not create new information, it only performs the sorting function. The testing function is now defined and its relationship to the sorting function considered.
extent that it acts as a filter, create new infcrmation about the abilities of students; or does it utilize known information to sort students according to their abilities? I term this creation of new information the testing function of higher education and the sorting of students, not surprisingly, the sorting function of higher education. A higher education system that acts as a filter will perform at least one of these functions. The higher education system described by Professor Arrow, in explaining the filter concept, does not create new information, it only performs the sorting function.
In the present study the testing function is defined and its relationship to the sorting function considered.
S.
THE TESTING AND SORTING FUNCTIONS OF HIGHER EDUCATION
The purpose of this paper is to discuss and clarify some issues raised by Professor K.J. Arrow in his paper 'Higher Education as a Filter' [1973] .
The problem that motivates my present interest in this topic can be summarized by the following question: Does higher education, to the extent that it acts as a filter, create new information about the abilities of students; or does it utilize known information to sort students according to their abilities? I term this creation of new information the testing function of higher education and the sorting of students, not surprisingly, the sorting function of higher education. A higher education system that acts as a filter will perform at least one of these functions. The higher education system described by Professor Arrow, in explaining the filter concept, does not create new information, it only performs the sorting function. In the present study the testing function is defined and its relationship to the sorting function considered.
The role usually ascribed to higher education by economists is that of a human capital accumulator, in the sense that colleges are assumed to improve students' talents. If higher education plays this role it can contribute to the economic performance of society by improving the productivity of those who have attended college. The alternative role proposed by Professor Arrow is that of a filtering device "in that it sorts out individuals of differing abilities, thereby conveying information to die purchasers of labor" [1973, p. 195 (a) his/her pre-college record, y, and (b) his/her unobservable productivity, z, where 0 < z < Let f(y,z) denote the joint density function of these two variables among school leavers. Suppose each school leaver wants to attend college but there are only a limited number of places available. The college is assumed to be interested only in the probability of a student graduating when deciding whom to admit. To simplify the exposition, Professor Arrow assumes the pre-college record of any school leaver is equal to the probability he/she will graduate if college is attended. Hence for each school leaver 0 < y < 1. Students who attend college either graduate or fail; they are not graded.
Suppose the college decides to maximize the expected number of graduates subject to the number of places available. To achieve this goal the college will select a yo and only admit school leavers with a pre-college record at least as great as yo.
The yo chosen will be such that the number of students allowed to attend college is equal to the number of places available. The claim that such an admission policy maximizes the stated objective follows directly from the assumption that pre-college records can be equated with probabilities .of graduating.
Utilizing this framework, Professor Arrow makes several claims that can be summarized as follows.
(a)
The college can act as a double filter, once in selecting entrants and once in passing or failing students.
(O.
The admission procedure specified conveys (positive) information If admission and/or graduation policies convey information, the college is said to act as a filter.
2.
The Sorting and Taatino Funttions in Higher Education
Before discussing these claims it will be useful to define more carefully certain terms mentioned earlier. First, higher education will be said to perform a sorting function if known information is used to create a nontrivial partition of a set of individuals. The admission procedure as 
i.e., the expected productivity of graduates with pre-college record y'
is greater than that of all school leavers with record y'. In one sense it can be argued that the college system described by Professor Arrow is the opposite of a filter mechanism. He assumes that firms interested in purchasing labor know only if an individual has graduated or not; information abou e pre-college record is assumed to disappear when students attend college. However, firms could presumably Hence, a college that implements such a test and graduation policy performs a testing function, since (1) is satisfied for all y' > yo. Note that this graduation policy also acts as a filter in Professor Arrow's terms.
Can a higher education system which performs only the sorting function be justified in the sense that it contributes to the economic performance of a society? Two situations spring to mind which lead to an affirmative answer. First, suppose there are large sorting costs. For example, assume the information that goes to form an individual's pre-college record is difficult to collect, involving a nontrivial collection cost. The purchasers of labor may prefer paying a higher education system to perform this task on each individual to doing it themselves, if there are economies 7 of scale in collection. However, ti.ere are other insti*utional arrangements which are often assumed to play this role, e.g., personnel depilitments, employment agencies, and high school career advisors. Second, Fuppose the college is the only institution that knows the probabilistic relationship beo-een pre-college records and productivity. This knowledge is a saleable commodity. Indeed, an important function of a college may be to ascertain this relationship.
Higher Education as a Self-Selection Device
A concept related to those under discussion is that of a self-selection device. This idea was first discussed within the context of a labor market by Salop and Salop [1972] . Higher education will said to act as a self-selection device if it motivates a group of individuals to sort themselves so as to create new information about productivities.
Hence, if higher education is a self-selection device it performs a testing function. The special feature of a system that acts as a selfselect!on device is that individuals sort themseles out according to their productivity because of a correlation between productivity ond tleir preferences.
An example will help e;:plain this concept. Suppose there are two groups of school leavers, one group having high productivity and the other low productivity. No one knows which individuals belong to which group. Further, assume there does not exist a test which can determine which of the school leavers have high or low productivity. In this case a higher -.ducation oyster', cannot create information about productivities directly. However, suppose it is known that high productivity school leavers prefEr a quiet environment to a noisy one, whereas low productivity wo-k-is prefer the opposite. Assume that the cost r.,f obt,Aning a higher education and the waze rates in the labor market are such that the expected lifetime income net of the cost of higher education to college entrants In equal to the expected lifetime income of non-college-entrants. If college offers a quiet environment and the work situation a noisy one, only high-productivity workers will apply to attend college. Hence, because of a feature (quiet) 'seemingly unrelated to productivity, the college has acted as a self-selection device, since preference for quiet is correlated with high productivity among school leavers.
Other features apart from a quiet environment may play a similarrole.
Many other factors can complicate the above simpleminded example.
For example, the result may still hold even If there is an incr expected lifetime income from attending college. The tnformctio: ed hr such a higher education system as that described above can be of use to the purchasers of labor services in assigning workers to jobs.
For educational policy purposes it is Important to determine the relative Importance of the possible roles of higher education. For example, if the capital accumulation role is most important, effort should be expended on what to teach students, as in this case students learn skills from faculty.
If the testing function is the most important function, effort should be expended on obtaining information about students. Finally, if the self-selection element is Most important, the cotcnt is relevant only insofar as high--1 productivity students like it and low-productivity students do not. for at least one y' where F is the conditional distribution function.
